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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAMELA PECK, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. 
WILLIAM DUNN I PETE KUTULAS I 
) 
) 
and WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, as 
Members of the Board of County) 
Conrrnissioners of Salt Lake 
County, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
Case No, 15338 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant initiated this action in the lower court 
to obtain declarative and injunctive relief from the enforcement 
of Title 16, Chapter 3, Section 28 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On the 29th day of June, 1977, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
Judge of the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, denied appellant's Motion for Sunnnary Judgment, and granted 
respondents''Motion to Dismiss orr the ground that Title 16, Chapter 
3' Section 28 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County is 
constitutional and a valid exercise of the powers of the Board of 
County Connnissioners of Salt Lake County. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's deci, 
which held Title 16, Chapter 3, Section 28 of the Revised Ordin; 
of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended, valid, constitutional, a: 
enforceable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Effective May 20, 1976, Salt Lake County enacted Title 10 
Chapter 3, Section 28 (h) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County making it a nuisance to keep animals for fighting. The 
ordinance reads: 
"(h) Nuisance to keep animals for fighting. Any person, 
firm or corporation who shall raise, keep or use any animal, fowl 
or bird for the purpose of fighting or baiting; and any person who 
shall be a party to or be present as a spectator at any such fighting 
or baiting of any animal or fowl; and any person, firm or corporatio: 
who shall rent any building, shed, room, yard, ground or premises 
for any such purposes as aforesaid; or shall knowingly suffer or 
permit the use of his buildings, sheds, rooms, yards, grounds or 
premises for the purposes aforesaid; and any person, firm or cor-
poration who shall knowingly carry, haul or deliver any animal, 
fowl or bird to be used for any of the purposes aforesaid, shall be 
guilty of a Class "B" misdemeanor, and shall be subject to a fine 
in an amount not to exceed $299 .00 or imprisonment in the county 
jail not to exceed six months, or both. " 
On January 8, 1977, appellant was present at a cockfight,' 
was arrested for violating the above ordinance provisions. Appel' 
subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action on March 21, Bi 
seeking a declaration that the above ordinance was unconstitutic;. 
On April 13, 1977, respondents moved to dismiss appellant" 
complaint, and appellant moved for summary judgment. Respondent! 
motion to dismiss was granted on June 29, 1977 on the ground th&' 
said ordinance was constitutional and a valid exercise of their 1' 
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lative powers. Appellant's motion for summary judgment was denied 
in the same order. 
Appellant then appealed the lower court's decision. 
POINT I 
COCKFIGHTING IS A FORM OF GAMBLING INVOLVING 
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, WHICH CAN BE PROHIBTTED 
BY ORDINANCE 
Pursuant to Sec, 17-5-35, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, and 
Article VI §28 of the Constitution of Utah, Salt Lake County is em-
powered to enact ordinances to prevent gambling involving cruelty 
to animals. In enacting Section 16-3-28(h) of the Revised Ordi-
nances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended, Salt Lake County 
passed a police ordinance conforming to Section 76-10-1101(1), U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, prohibiting gambling; and Sec. 76-9-301(1), U.C.A., 
1953, as amended, prohibiting cruelty to animals. Section 76-10-
1101(1), U.C.A., 1953, as amended, defines gambling as: 
" .. (the) outcome of a contest, game, gaming scheme, 
or gambling scheme, or gaming device when the return 
or outcome is based on an element of chance ... " 
,Cockfighting has long been considered as a game of chance; see 
·Kilpatrick vs. State, 58 N .M. 88, 265 P-. 2d 978 (1953); National 
~ference on Legalizing Lotteries vs. Farley, 68 App. D.C. 319, 
96 F. 2d 861 (1938) (writ of cert. den. in 305 U.S. 624, 83 L.Ed. 
399, 69 S.Ct. 85); and in Bagley vs. State, 1 Humph (Tenn.) 486 
(l840). where it was observed that there is scarcely any event more 
deoendent upon hazard and address than the result of a cockfight. 
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Cockfighting in Utah is also considered as cruelty to ar,:· 
under Sec. 76-9-301, U.C.A., 1953, as amended: 
"A person commits cruelty to animals if he intentiona:: 
or knowingly: 
(f) causes one animal to fight with another." 
Salt Lake County was therefore acting within its police 
powers in enacting Sec. 16-3-28 of the Revised Ordinances of Sal:. 
Lake County, 1966, as amended, banning cockfighting within Salt. 
County limits. 
POINT I I 
THE ORDINft.NCE PROHIBITING SPECTATORS FROM 
ATTENDING COCKFIGHTS IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF 
DUE PROCESS AS BEING VAGUE, INDEFINITE, OR 
OVERLY BROAD 
Under Section 76-2-202, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, one is 
criminally responsible for the conduct of another if he encourw 
that person to engage in conduct which constitutes a criminal oL 
Section 76-2-202, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, states: 
"Every person, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense who directly coll11l1its the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable ai 
a party for such conduct." 
Therefore, where one attends cockfight gaming activities:· 
hibited under state law, he encourages the performance of illeg•. 
acts, and is liable as a principal. This law of principals is cc:· 
sis tent with prior case law, where persons looking on and encouri 
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· although they do not bet, may be indicted as principals,· gaming, 
see ~gate vs. State, 21 Tenn, (2 Humph) 397 (1841); Johnson vs. 
State, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 614 (1857); Territory vs. Wong, 40 Hawaii 
-
257 (1953), overruled in State vs. Abellano, 50 Hawaii 384, 441 
P.2d 333 (1968); Opinion of Justices, 73 N.H. 625, 63 A. 505 (1906) 
Nor is the ordinance inconsistent with state law. The Utah 
Legislature subsequently passed House_ Bill 281 in the last legis-
! lative session, and also made it a misdemeanor for any person to be 
a spectator at a cockfight. Sec. 76-9-301.5, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, was amended to read: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to be a spectator 
at an organized animal fight. 
(2) For the purpose of this section only, an organi~ed 
animal fight means a fight between animals for the benefit 
of spectators. There is no requirement that an admission 
fee be charged. 
In summary, where the ordinance prohibits spectators from being 
., present at a cockfight, the ordinance is not vague or indefinite so 
that men of reasonable intelligence must unnecessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application, to violate due process, 
State vs. Packard, 122 U. 369, 250 P. 2d 561 (1953) ; State vs. Musser, 
118 U. 537, 223 P. 2d 193 (1950). 
The ordinance term "spectator" is commonly found in the English 
language, so that no confusion to men of reasonable intelligence 
ga. results to make the ordinance violative of due process. Specifically, 
or: ~bster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (G. & C. Merriam Co.; 
ra l967 Chicago, Tll) at page 839, defines spectator as: 
"Spec ta Lor one who looks on or watches; onlooker-- ... " 
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Appellant cites the State vs. Abellano case, supra 0 , ver. 
ruling the Territory vs. Wong case. supra, where the Hawaii Sur 
Co11rt~ in interpreting a different set of statutes, required a 
spectator to be defined by ordinance as an observor within a nar 
confined space before due process requirements were satisfied. 
Respondents submit that this interpretation would place an over! 
restrictive law enforcement burden on Salt Lake County where man 
of the cockfighting, and dogfighting events occur in isolated, 0 
door, open areas, which do not accommodate succinct, spatial defi 
as to the location of the onlooker. Indeed, an exact spatial de 
nition could work a hardship where an individual by chance was 1 
the spatial zone and presumed a spectator, when in fact he was n 
Respondents therefore submit that the ordinance making it a ques 
of fact whether an individual was a spectator at a cockfight is 
constitutional, and not vague or indefinite where the general po 
knows what a spectator is; see People vs. Ramirez, 18 P .R.R. 260 
(1912) where the Porto Rican Supreme Court indicated that if its 
legislature intended to punish a spectator, said legislative ex€ 
would be a valid exercise of its police powers. 
POINT Ill 
THE COUNTY ORDINANCE WHICH PUNISHES SPECTATORS 
PRESENT AT A COCKFIGHT IS A PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENSE, 
WHICH REQUIRES NO MENTAL ELEMENT 
For the purposes of the declaratory judgment action initi 
pursuant to Sec. 78-33-2, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, challenging 
the validity of Sec. 16-3-28(h) of the Revised Ordinances of Sal 
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Lake county, it is presumed that Ms. Pamela Peck was unlawfully 
" ... present as a spectator at such fighting or baiting of a fowl" 
in order to have standing to bring the action. Appellant seems to 
ignore this presumption, by arguing that there is no evidence in 
ilie record to indicate that Ms. Peck was present as a spectator, 
or that she intended to be present as a spectator or that she 
intended to conunit an offense or that she intended that others 
should commit an offense. Indeed, appellant is attempting to 
redefine the elements of the. crime by making the cockfighting 
ordinance into an intentional crime. The county ordinance which 
punishes spectators present at a cockfight gaming event is a public 
welfare offense, which requires no mental element; Morissette vs. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 96 L.Ed 288, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1951). 
Where the legislature or its political subdivisions create such an 
offense, criminal intent in any of its forms is not an element of 
the crime and need not be proved to justify a conviction; People vs. 
McClennegen, 195 Cal. 445, 234 P.91 (1925); People vs. Del Toro, 
(Colo) 395 P.2d 357 (1964); People vs. Fernow, 286 Ill 627, 122 
N.E. 155 (1919); Hays vs. Schueler, 107 Kan 635, 193 P. 311, 11 ALR 
1433 (1920); and Haggerty vs. St. Louis Ice Mfg. & Storage Co., 143 
Mo 238, 44 S.W. 1114 (1898). Due process is not violated by the 
fact that mens rea is not a required element of such a crime, 
United States vs. Green Baum (CA3 NJ), 138 F. 2d 437, 152 ALR 751 
(1943). 
It is therefore within the power of the Board of County 
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Connnissioners to declare an act criminal irrespecti"ve f 0 the in· 
or knowledge of the doer: Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. vs. Un~ 
States, 220 U.S. 559, 55 L.Ed 582, 31 S.Ct. 612 (1911); ~ 
Del Toro, supra; People vs. Johnson 288 Ill 442, 123 N.E. 543 ,, 
ALR 1535 (1919); State vs. Avery, 111 Kan 588, 207 P. 838, 2H 
453 (1922); State vs. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E. 2d 768, 90t 
2d 804 (1961); Connnonweal th vs. Junkin, 170 Pa 194, 32 A. 617 (; 
Hunter vs. State, 158 Tenn 63, 12 S. W. 2d 361, 61 ALR 1148 (191: 
State vs. La Bonte, 120 Vt 465, 144 A. 2d 792 (1958). For a mon 
complete analysis of the issue, see the discussion in 21 AmJur.: 
§§89 and 90, discussing the above cases. 
The new Utah Criminal Code, Title 76, U.C.A., 1953, asac 
specifically establishes status crimes involving strict li~illi 
to the perpetrator. Sec. 76-2-101, U. C .A., 1953, as amended, st 
"No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct 
is prohibited by law and; 
... ; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict 
liability." 
However, if a culpable mental state is required to violati 
the provisions of Sec. 16-3-28(h) of the Revised Ordinances of~ 
Lake County, 1966, as amended, the necessary elements may be ire· 
puted from Sec. 76-2-103, U.C.A., which defines the mental eleie: r 
necessary for intentional crimes: 
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"76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or 
maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent." -
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to 
the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the cond~ct or cause 
the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts 
knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware 
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes 
a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint." 
Sec. 16-3-28(h) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, 
as amended, is therefore not invalid for failing to specify a mental 
state required to violate its provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court did not err in granting defendant-respondents' 
motion for sununary judgment because the cockfighting ordinance is 
constitutional, and enforceable. The lower court's decision should 
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Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DONALD SAWAYA 
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorm 
MARCUS G. THEODORE 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respond~ 
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